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ABSTRACT  
 
 
A STUDY ON APPLICATION OF EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS  
 INTO SOUTH KOREAN FORCES  
 
By  
 
Don-Young Jang  
 
 
Modern and future warfare is pursuing the paralysis of adversary, not destruction. 
The US Forces has developed ancient unearned win concept into EBO (Effects-
Based Operations) and applied it to the Iraq War. Most states think that EBO is a 
sample to be followed in military and none-military actions because the U.S Forces 
verified the effectiveness of EBO through the Gulf and Iraq War. 
 
We have to prepare for urgent North Korean and potential threats of neighbor 
countries that have strengthened their military strength. After April 2012, the South 
Korea will get the full operational control in both war and peace time. The capabilities 
to execute combined operation with the US forces will be more important. Even 
though the ROK Forces is trying to apply EBO, I think there are no clear directions to 
do so. So this thesis will suggest the principle to apply EBO into the KOR Military 
Forces which are the speed, jointness, intelligence and precision. 
 
.  
 
 II 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
Abstract    ……………………………………………………………….....     Ⅰ 
Table of Contents    ………………………………………………………..     Ⅱ 
List of Tables    …………………………………………………………….    Ⅲ 
List of Figures    ……………………………………………………………    Ⅳ 
Acronyms    …………………………………………………………………    Ⅴ 
 
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION    ………………………………………….      1 
 
1.1 Purpose  
1.2 Methods and strategies  
 
Chapter 2. The Background of EBO    ……………………………………     6 
 
2.1 Concept Evolution   ……………………………………………….    6 
2.2 Defining Effects-Based Operations   …………………………….    11 
2.3 Effects-Based Operations Cycle    ………………………………    13 
 
Chapter 3. Analysis on Effects-Based Operations in the Iraq War  ……     23 
 
3.1 Speed   ……………………………………………………………..     24 
3.2 Jointness and Intelligence     ……………………………………     28 
3.3 Precision    ………………………………………………………..     32 
 
Chapter 4. Directions for Applying EBO into Korea Military Forces  ….    36 
 
4.1 Necessity of EBO   …………………………………………………    36 
4.2 Directions for Application   ……………………………….………    47 
 
Chapter 5. Conclusion   ……………………………………………………     53 
 
Appendices    ……………………………………………………………….    56 
Bibliography    ……………………………………………………………..     60 
 III 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
 
3.1 Comparison of Coalition Force Numbers between the Gulf and Iraq War 25 
 
3.2 Comparison of Iraq Force Numbers between the Gulf and Iraq War  26 
 
3.3 Maneuver Speed of Ground Forces      27 
 
3.4 Change of Decision Cycle Time      28 
 
3.5 Rounds of Precision Weapon used in the Iraq War    33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
2.1 The OODA Loop        7 
 
2.2 The Five Rings Model       8 
 
2.3 Series versus Parallel Warfare      9 
 
2.4 Types of Effect        11 
 
2.5 Effects-Based Operations Cycle      13 
 
2.6 ONA Key Components       15 
 
2.7 SoS Analysis        16 
 
2.8 ONA Process        16 
 
2.9 ONA Support to Effect-Based Planning     17 
 
2.10 The Procedure of establishment of ETO     18 
 
2.11 Intelligence Cycle        20 
 
4.1 Military Forces of the Four Major Powers in North East   39 
 
4.2 Potential North Korean Long-Range Missile Capabilities   42 
 
4.3 Time Plan for Transition of Wartime Operational Control   44 
 
4.4 Short, Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in China  46 
 
 
 
 V 
 
ACRONYMS  
 
BDA  Battle Damage Assessment  
CAS  Close Air Support  
CDR  Commander  
CFC  Combined Forces Command  
C4ISR  Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence,  
Surveillance and Reconnaissance  
COA  Course of Action  
COG  Center of Gravity  
CONOPS Concept of Operation  
COP  Common Operating Picture  
DOD  Department of Defense  
DIME  Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic  
EBO  Effects-based Operations  
ETO  Effects Tasking Order  
FOC  Full Operational Capability  
FSCL  Fire Support Coordination Line  
GFAC  Ground Frontier Air Controller  
GMC  Guided Missile Command  
IOC  Initial Operational Capability  
IPB  Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield  
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JIACG  Joint Intelligence coordination Group  
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System  
LOC  Line of Communications  
NCW  Network Centric Warfare  
MND  Ministry of National Defense  
MOP  Measure of Performance  
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness  
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War  
OIF  Operation Iraqi freedom  
ONA  Operational Net Assessment  
OPCON Operational Control  
 VI 
 
OPLAN Operation Plan  
PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information  
PGM  Precision Guidance Missile  
RDO  Rapid Decisive Operations  
SEAD  Suppression of Enemy Air Defense  
SoS  System of System  
SP  Strategic Paralysis  
UAVs  Unmanned Aerial vehicles  
USCENTCOM United States Central Command  
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command  
4GW  Forth Generation War  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
Chapter 1  INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1. 1 The purpose  
 
There are core national interests which all states pursue; security, prosperity, 
prestige. Because every state seeks after core interests, it is natural to conflict with 
each other through various means; war, diplomacy etc. According to realism, the 
nature of international relationship is anarchy. There is no world government to 
constrain a few hostile and aggressive states. Most states possess armed forces to 
solve this problem. Military power is necessity for autonomy and sovereignty. That's 
why most states have strengthened their military forces. This movement has 
increased the possibility of outbreak in the world. Therefore it is important to 
understand about war. 
 
 
Modern warfare is completely different from a past warfare due to advanced 
technology that has rapidly changed our environment. Before and during the 20th 
century most warfare focused on attrition or annihilation and sequential or serial 
concept that resulted in bloody and protracted battles. However, recently stealth 
weapon, PGM (Precision Guidance Missile) and intelligence communication (which 
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high technology has been applied to) make it possible to execute parallel or 
simultaneous attack without mass casualty. So the past destruction-based thinking has 
slowly moved backward. Instead of it, the strategic paralysis concept has been 
visualized by the U.S forces in Gulf and Iraq War.  
 
 
As another example, in 1989 William S. Lind defined that Fourth Generation 
Warfare (4GW) is a decentralized form. That means the nation states loss their 
monopoly on combat forces and the major participants in war is not a state but a 
violent ideological network. So there are many types of war and enemies that can be 
state and non-state, and we have faced an ambiguous border line between soldier and 
civilian, peace and conflict, war and politics. The modern and future warfare will be 
more uncertain. Therefore, the U.S military introduced the Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW) to enlarge the military operation's domain to rapidly 
response various enemy and war effectively and efficiently. To cope with irregular 
enemy and diverse mission the U.S military has developed new concept called Effects 
- Based Operations.  
 
 
EBO is to achieve rapid victory by attacking the core of enemy's ability and will to 
fight with the asymmetric advantages in knowledge, precision and mobility etc. EBO 
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was first introduced in the Gulf War in 1991. At that time EBO was executed by 
mainly missile and airplane. But EBO has been more developed through the Kosovo 
War in 1999 and the Afghanistan War in 2001, which proposed the necessity ground 
forces. In the Iraq War in 2003 the modified EBO played a major role in ending war 
rapidly within 26 days. Today many military strategy scholars have been interested in 
the Iraq War which was applied to EBO. They thought the Iraq war as the future 
warfare which would focus on the paralysis of will to fight and be the fifth dimension, 
including ground, sea, sky, space and internet. Also most states have developed their 
military system to apply EBO in weapon system, military structure and 
communication system etc.  
 
 
To prepare the future war and potential threat, we have to, because Korea is not big 
country, develop and enhance our military strength in both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects. To get the maximum effect with minimum effort we have to develop and 
study especially military strategy and operation art. Therefore the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND) announced the Military Reform 2020 in 2006 and the 
MND made law to implement the reform without suspension. But some expert argued 
that the military reform was lack of operation art. That is, the Military Reform 2020 
focuses on the force structure and new weapon system, but don't mention about the 
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employment military strength. This thesis will suggest directions for applying EBO 
into the Korea Military Forces in the aspect of rapid speed, precision, intelligence and 
jointness by examining closely the concept of EBO and analyzing how to apply EBO 
to the Iraq War.  
 
 
1.2. The Methods and Strategies  
 
This study focuses on the concept of EBO including its background and explains 
how to apply EBO to the Iraq War by US Forces. Based on basic analysis, one of 
ways to apply EBO to ROK Forces will be suggested in terms of speed, jointness, 
intelligence and precision  
 
 
After 2003, the study on EBO has been carried out with CFC (ROK/US Combined 
forces Command) as center in South Korea Forces. Even though the study on EBO 
has a short period, many military experts and officers published their theses and books. 
So methods of my study are to survey existing all journal, theses, research paper and 
books. Because there are not enough data in the South Korea, I used American web 
site such as Fighter Tactics Academy and military Journals.  
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Based on those methods and focuses, this thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 
will explain the concept of EBO, and the history of EBO and the procedure to execute 
EBO. Chapter 3 will show the detail data to prove the effectiveness of EBO through 
analysis on the Iraq War in four points of view: speed, jointness, intelligence and 
precision. In chapter 4 I will explain the necessity of EBO and suggest directions for 
developing EBO in ROK Forces.  
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Chapter 2  The Background of EBO  
  
2. 1 Concept Evolution  
 
After the Vietnam War the U.S armed forces learned important lessons: they cannot 
win the war through only destruction and attrition strategy; attacking physical targets 
such as soldiers, territory can be no benefit; other parts like political, diplomatic 
aspect must be considered to be winner. Therefore the U.S has developed its military 
strategy not to make a mistake again. Many new concepts on military strategy, 
operation and tactics have been studies, which have strategic paralysis of enemy in 
common.  
 
 
The notion of Strategic Paralysis (SP) had been developed in the past. Over two 
thousand years ago, the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu laid the theoretical groundwork 
for no war win conception. He said " The general rule for the use of the military is 
that it is better to keep a nation intact than to destroy it. It is better to keep an army 
intact that to destroy it. Therefore, those who win every battle are not really skillful∙∙∙∙ 
those who render others' armies helpless without fighting are the best of all." He did 
emphasize on the adversary's will to win as a best means, not physical destruction. 
Another typical strategist, Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, recognized that there were at 
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least two distinct forms of warfare: absolute and real war. Absolute war focused on 
total annihilation of the enemy. In contrast, real war entailed more limited plans of 
attack in which annihilation was not a strategic option due to restrictions imposed by 
political ends and/or military means. As a result of war's dual nature, his definition of 
armed force destruction is as compatible with paralysis as it is with annihilation.  
 
 
Recently the Strategic Paralysis (SP) has been developed by John Boyd's OODA 
Loop and John Warden's Five Rings model. Those two models are a basis of SP and 
had an important impact on the EBO. Figure 2.1 presents the decision-making cycle. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The OODA Loop  
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According to John Boyd, decision-making occurs in a continuous cycle of “observe - 
orient - decide – act” in every individual and organization. Figure 2.1 shows 
observation of the evolving situation is a basis of all decision: orientation is the 
filtering of information through heritage, culture and experience. We should operate 
the OODA Loop to win at a faster tempo than our adversaries', which means we 
should get inside adversary's OODA time cycle. This generates confusion and 
disorder among adversaries. This reduction of time cycle can be possible through the 
development of C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) due to new technology. Warden’s 
thinking on strategic paralysis was different from Boyd’s thinking. 
 
.  
 
Figure 2.2 The Five Rings Model  
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According to John Warden, the enemy is a system with five strategic rings. (Figure 
2.2) These "rings" are leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and 
fielded military forces. Leadership represents the most lucrative target set by which to 
incapacitate an opponent because it commands and controls all system operations. 
Finally, strategic attack should predominantly focus on the enemy's center ring called 
COG1 (Centers of Gravity).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Series versus Parallel Warfare 
 
The existent attack was executed in sequential way form military forces to leadership. 
However, Warden insists the parallel or simultaneous attack to get enemy's paralysis 
                                            
1 COG (Centers of Gravity) is defined as those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a 
military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight by DOD 
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of system. He said "In any events, the ultimate target of all strategic attack must 
always be the mind of the enemy command". This parallel or simultaneous attack can 
be feasible through the new technology like stealth aircraft, PGM etc. (figure 2.3) 
 
 
While Boyd focuses on the psychological paralysis in process that leads to disorder 
and confusion, Warden puts emphasis on the incapacity of system through paralysis 
of COG. However, these models presents the Strategic Paralysis (SP) is more 
important than attrition or annihilation. This concept has been improved as Rapid 
Decisive Operations (RDO) in the U.S Army, Network Centric Warfare (NCW) in 
the Navy and EBO in the Air Force. Especially the EBO played a decisive role in the 
Gulf War. Therefore, the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was 
established to transform the U.S military capabilities in 1999 and has developed EBO 
as leading approach to execute MOOTW. Now EBO is essential in the military and 
none-military actions in U.S Forces. Most states have pursued the application of U.S 
EBO. So there are many definitions and explanations on EBO. But I will explain the 
EBO on the basis of U.S concept. 
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2. 2 Defining Effects-Based Operations  
 
According to USJFCOM, EBO is a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome 
or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full 
range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic 
level. EBO emphasizes achieving some sort of policy objective in more efficient and 
effective manner instead of destructing physical capability or finding enemy to be 
killed. Furthermore, an "effect" is the physical or behavioral outcome, event, or 
consequence that results from the specific military or non-military actions. Figure 2.4 
presents two aspects of effect. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Types of Effects  
 
Physical effects include disruption (e.g., delay of an army’s maneuver by destroying 
a bridge), damage (e.g., kills of tanks or installations), and the killing of soldiers. 
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Behavioral effects are to demoralize and thereby reduce the fighting capability of 
military forces (or a population), to slow actions (to the point of paralysis), to confuse 
and deceive local and higher-level commanders, or to influence decisions - e.g., to 
convince, deter, or compel. In EBO, actions and their effects are not and cannot be 
isolated. They are interrelated and cumulative, resulting as 2nd, 3rd and n th order 
effects of an action or combination of actions and effects2. 
 
 
While the existent warfare sought mainly the physical effects, EBO focuses on the 
behavioral effects including physical effects. EBO regards the enemy as a System of 
System (SoS) consisted of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, 
information (PMESII) to get these effects. This analysis on SoS can bring victory 
without widespread damage on infrastructure and casualties through the elimination 
of key linking parts in SoS. EBO is not new concept. It is revised strategic paralysis 
reflecting the new technology3 and current and future warfare. The core in EBO is 
                                            
2 Six basic rules of the game define EBO: actions create effects, effect are cumulative, reaction cycles 
will have active and passive participants, action-reaction cycles occur simultaneously in multiple 
dimension, all actions and effects at each level and in each area are interrelated, effects are both 
physical and psychological.  
 
3 The new technology called the triple technical revolution is a sensor technology, information and 
weapon technology.  
 
 - 13 - 
 
attacking pivotal target sets to result in a systemic collapse or paralysis of the enemy 
with low cost of lives and resources on both sides.  
 
 
2. 3 Effects - Based Operations Cycle  
 
EBO is operated in a continuous cycle with five related steps. (See figure 2.5.) The 
first step called knowledge, is gaining full complete knowledge of the enemy. Next 
step is to determine the desired effects to shape the enemy's environment through 
analysis of knowledge. Third step is the application to determine the best means to 
achieve the desired effects. Simultaneously, the assessment steps starts to measure the 
impact of effects created. Final step, adaptation, is to adjust Course of Actions 
(COA) to reach desired end-state efficiently and rapidly. 
 
.  
Figure 2.5 Effect-Based Operations Cycle  
 
 - 14 - 
 
2.3.1 Knowledge  
 
In EBO, the enemy is regarded as a complex system. Therefore, EBO needs a 
complete and clear understanding of the political, military, economic, cultural and 
informal environment that shapes the behavior of adversary at a given moment. 
Knowledge step is to gain clear knowledge, co-own its knowledge among user at all 
military level and build a system, process or organization to do so. In this step, 
decision makers or planners can identify potential effects and decisive linking pots, 
called nodes, which lead to the desired effects. The identification of effects and node, 
which is at the core of this step, is related to the achievement of commander's intent. 
That is possible through the Operational Net Assessment (ONA). 
 
 
The Operational Net Assessment is an integrated plans, operations, and intelligence 
process: 1) to synthesize information available across the interagency community into 
a coherent understanding of the enemy as a complex adaptive system, ourselves as a 
nationally networked set of available all national power, and ourselves as seen 
through the eyes of the adversary; 2) to convert information to actionable knowledge. 
The ONA can help planners and decision makers focus capabilities when, and how 
needed to achieve pivotal effects. The key elements of ONA are; 1) strategic context – 
strategic / political guidance and understanding the adversary vs. friendly intentions/ 
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capabilities; 2) Knowledge of the adversary - the full knowledge through system of 
system analysis; 3) knowledge of national DIME capabilities - diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic ways and means; 4) effects model - 2nd, 3rd and 
nth effects, simulates cause and effects. (Figure 2.6)  
 
 
Figure 2.6 ONA Key Components  
 
Especially, the knowledge of enemy is acquired through the fusion of information 
from a broad spectrum of sources, which is a System of System Analysis (SoSA). 
SoSA is done by a team of cultural, behavioral, technical, economic, military and 
political expert.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 presents the system of system analysis, which examines the enemy as a 
complex system to understand key relationships, dependencies, nodes, vulnerabilities, 
strengths and weakness from the viewpoint of PMESII. 
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Figure 2.7 System of Systems Analysis  
 
Figure 2.8 illustrates the ONA process. This process is to build actionable 
knowledge base, which contains effects, actions, and enemy's view including ours. 
This base is a result of consideration of: potential effects, actions / resources, and 
nodes / relationships acquired by SoSA.  
 
 
Figure 2.8 ONA Process  
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In conclusion, the knowledge stage is to provide decision makers with right 
information at right time, which give them to decision superiority. Commanders must 
be able to find the COG and core targets of the enemy through knowledge stage.  
 
 
2. 3.2 Effects  
 
After commander receives his objective from high-level commander, he will identify 
the desired effects to achieve his objective. Figure 2.9 explains the process of 
planning effects. Final addressed effects, the result of comparison between desired 
and potential effects, have to be linked means and tasks.  
 
 
Figure 2.9 ONA Support to Effects-Based Planning  
 
Also all available resources: DIME, close coordination with subordinate commands; 
have to be considered to develop and decide COA. The decided COA needs the 
measures to judge its success, called Measures of Performance (MOP) and 
 - 18 - 
 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 4 . Additionally, ISR is required to achieve 
commander's objective. 
 
 
Effects Tasking Order (ETO), the result of this process, provides guidance in terms 
of effects, priorities, constraints, and intent to components and other agencies. 
According to the USJFCOM concept, ETO maintains “the explicit linking of strategic 
objectives and desired outcomes to tactical actions, the strategy-to-task linkage, so 
that as resources are tasked to take actions, every tactical action has a clear and 
traceable link to the strategic objective.”  So related units follow and develop ETO, 
and ETO has to be concrete for preventing misunderstanding. Figure 2.10 shows the 
process of forming ETO. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 The Procedure of establishment of ETO 
                                            
4 According to the USJFCOM, MOE is defined as the subjective criteria used to evaluate how actions 
have affected system behavior or capabilities, and MOP is defined as objective criteria used to 
evaluate accomplishment of Blue (friendly) actions. (USJFCOM, 2004, 17)  
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In this process, objectives have to be first to be considered. The desired effects are for 
achieving objectives, and tasks are linked to get the desired outcomes at tactical, 
operational and strategic level.  
 
 
2.3.3 Application  
 
This application phase is an execution stage of plan, and deciding and applying all 
applicable and available capabilities including diplomatic, information, military and 
economic to achieve the desired effects in most effective ways. The close cooperation, 
communication, coordination and synergistic operation among components are 
needed to control the enemy, and to get the desired effect.  
 
 
 
2.3.4 Assessment  
 
Commanders or planners can judge whether or not to adjust the current course of 
action through assessment step. Assessment has to include 1) if military actions 
produced some or all of the desired effects; 2) what collateral or unintended effects 
were produced; 3) the overall impact on joint effort; and 4) how the tactical action 
contributed to achievement of the desired outcome. This assessment is a continuous, 
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dynamic evaluation of associated MOPs and MOEs. Commanders must reflect the 
result of assessment through changing their COA.  
 
 
This step is closely related to intelligence. Only ISR assets including human 
intelligence can identify the result of military actions as well as target to strike for 
acquiring desired effects. Therefore, MOPs and MOES are treated by intelligence 
cycle. Joint Pub 2-0 describes the intelligence cycle as consisting of planning, 
collecting, processing, analyzing, exploiting, and disseminating. (Figure 2.11)  
 
 
Figure 2.11 Intelligence Cycle  
 
In Planning, the development of MOPs and MOEs are done by analyzing the clear 
connection in the knowledge on the enemy: how it fails, and how it operates. These 
measures must meet two conditions: 1) they are related to objectives; 2) they consider 
the capabilities of available Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recognizance (ISR) assets. 
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Collection, Processing, and Exploitation use the measures developed in planning to 
task ISR assets and fuse intelligence information following the execution phase. 
 
 
Processing and analyzing is the core of assessment. According to EBO concept in 
the JFCOM, it is a two-step process. Step one seeks to identify what physical and 
non-physical effects have been created in the enemy's system. Step two identifies 
whether direct or indirect collateral effects were produced and why these collateral 
effects occurred. This analysis assesses 1) if the predicted or intended effects were 
produced; 2) the magnitude of the direct effects produced; 3) what indirect effects, if 
any, were produced; and 4) what delayed effects are in motion and how long/what 
additional effort is needed to produce these effects.  
 
 
2.3.5 Adaptation  
 
Based on assessment, the current COA is reviewed. Contingency plans are 
formulated, if required, and recommendations to modify the current COA are made to 
achieve the desired effect. In adaptation, the commander can adjust his course of 
action to more effectively achieve the desired end-state through the continuous 
assessment of the enemy, military and political actions including friendly situation.  
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 To sum up, EBO is a renewal of unearned win concept to quickly response to 
various threats from military and non-military enemy. EBO is seeking after Strategic 
Paralysis (SP) and parallel warfare or simultaneous attack. In addition, EBO include 
objective-oriented and target-oriented operation. To do so, EBO is operated in 
continuous 5 steps; knowledge, effects, application, assessment and adaptation. 
Knowledge base, which is built through ONA and SoSA, is the foundation for 
identification of COG. The desired effects for neutralizing COG should be linked 
tasks in detail and also develop the means to verify the result of military actions like 
MOPs and MOEs, finally the assessment must be reflected in current COA to achieve 
desired outcome. Up to now the background, definition and process of EBO were 
explained. Now I will explain how the US Forces applied EBO in the Iraq War.  
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Chapter 3  The Case of the Effects-Based Operations in the Iraq War  
 
EBO is just theory, not reality. The analysis on application of EBO into reality is 
important to understand the concept of EBO, and to study how to adapt it into the 
Korean Military Forces. The guide to analyze can be found in characteristics of the 
Iraq War. 
 
 
 Characteristics of the Iraq War can be understood by Secretary Rumsfeld. He said 
that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) had yielded several key lessons: 1) The 
importance of speed, and the ability to get inside enemy’s decision cycle and strike 
before he is able to mount a coherent defense; 2) The importance of jointness, and 
the ability of U.S. forces to fight, not as individual de-conflicted services, but as a 
truly joint force. Maximizing the power and lethality they bring to bear; 3) The 
importance of intelligence, and the ability to act on intelligence rapidly, in minutes, 
instead of days and even hours; 4) The importance of precision, and the ability to 
deliver devastating damage to enemy positions, while sparing civilian lives and the 
civilian infrastructure.  
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Finally, keynotes of OIF are speed, jointness, intelligence and precision, which 
enable the U.S forces to make a parallel and simultaneous attack, and are the core for 
executing Effects – Based Operations. That is, four parts is essential in executing 
EBO in the real war. I will show how four elements were applied to execute EBO in 
the Iraq War. 
 
3. 1 Speed  
 
If one can seize the ground with vital importance, or make a decision faster than 
enemy expected, then enemy would be struck with panic. Speed implicates two 
aspects, ability to attack faster than enemy's response as well as fast decision cycle.  
 
 
Firstly, from the viewpoint of the number of troops, although many military experts 
have insisted three to one advantage in mass to defeat enemy, U.S forces thought that 
mass was not the best measure of power in a conflict. This is true: when Baghdad fell, 
there were just over 100,000 American forces on the ground. In spite of 100,000 
American forces, they overwhelmed the enemy with advanced capabilities, and using 
those capabilities in innovative and unexpected ways.  
 
 
 
Table 3.1  
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Comparison of Force Numbers between the Gulf and Iraq War  
 
 
Gulf War Iraq War 
Army 
U.S Coalition U.S British Others 
295,000 105,000 67,000 26,000 659 
tank/armored vehicle: 3,100/4,050 
tank/armored: 1,800 
attack helicopter: 200 
Air Force 
56,000 - 37,000 81,000 470 
aircraft: 2,600 aircraft: 1,003 
Navy 
82,000 - 70,000 4,000 1,153 
naval vessel: 191 naval vessel: 120 
Marine 
94,000 - 70,000 4,000 - 
- aircraft: 372 
Others - 100,000 5,000 1,000 430 
subtotal 527,000 295,000 249,000 43,100 2,703 
total 822,000 294,803 
 
Table 3.1 shows force numbers of coalition in the Gulf and Iraq war. The number in 
the Gulf War is around three times as much as that of coalition forces in the Iraq War 
Also, table 3.2 explains the number of Iraq forces during the Gulf and Iraq War. The 
total number of Iraq forces is about 1.5 times as that of coalition forces in the Iraq 
War. Especially, the number of Iraq ground forces, 375,000 is about two times than 
that of coalition, around 170,000 including marine. Although the number of coalition 
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forces was smaller than that of Iraq, coalition forces wined the war. This illustrates 
that three to one advantage in mass is not useful.  
 
Table 3.2  
Comparison of Iraq Force Numbers between the Gulf and Iraq War  
 
 
Gulf War Iraq War 
Army 
955,000 375,000 
tank/armored vehicle: 5,500 
field artillery: 2,518 
tank/armored: 5,900 
field artillery: 2,500 helicopter: 375 
Air Force 
40,000 20,000 
aircraft: 689 aircraft: 775 
Navy 
5,000 2,000 
naval vessel: 60 naval vessel: 18 
Others Scud launcher: 66 
Air Defense Commander: 17,000 
paramilitary forces: 44,000 
total 1,000,000 429,000 
 
This small-scale force has useful advantages in deployment and maneuver. In the 
Gulf War U.S Forces took six months to deploy troops in the vicinity of Iraq. In 
contrast, in the Iraq War U.S could deploy about 250.000 forces to the Iraq in only 
two months, which is one third of the period in the Gulf War. This rapid deployment 
made the Iraq surprised; finally the Iraq guidance division did not make a careful 
preparation for war. In the aspect of maneuver, U.S. forces had already moved the 
distance of the longest maneuver in the 1991 Gulf War in one quarter of the time. 
They advanced within 50 miles on Baghdad on Day 8, entered Baghdad International 
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Airport on Day 16, and were in the center of Baghdad on Day 20. That is, ground 
forces advanced to the Baghdad at the speed of average 80Km per day. (See Table3.3)  
 
Table 3.3  
 Maneuver Speed of Ground Forces  
 
 
WWⅡ Korean War Six-Day War Gulf War Iraq War 
Speed 15 Km 18 Km 25 Km 40 Km 80 Km 
(Speed: the average maneuver distance per day) 
 
This quick maneuver was showed urban operation. In battle of Baghdad, the sheer 
speed of the V Corps and 1st MEF5 penetration into the regime's center of power in 
Baghdad enabled the Coalition to launch deep armored penetrations and raids into 
Baghdad. These "thunder runs" demoralized some of the defenders, further weakened 
the Iraqi regime's control over the city and the nation. 
 
 
In conclusion, physical speed can be improved by employing the small-scaled troops 
to attack enemy rapidly and response quickly various situation. This rapid movement 
make adversary confused and paralyze the enemy system.  
In the quick decision cycle, U.S forces could reduce the time from observation to 
action within one hour. Compare to WWⅡ, one hour is too fast. Table 3.4 shows the 
                                            
5 MEF: Middle East Forces 
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reduction of decision cycle. As already written, enemy is unable to control its 
components due to faster decision, which is called Strategic Paralysis (SP). This speed 
can be achieved through the development of C4ISR system and PGM.  
 
Table 3.4  
Change of Decision Cycle Time  
 
  WWⅡ Gulf War Iraq War 
communication radio / wireless nearly real time real time 
judgment a few times a few minute a few minute 
decision a few days a few times a few minutes 
action one week one day one hour 
 
The rapid speed in both maneuver and decision cycle induces the paralysis of control 
among adversaries, which is the core of EBO. However, paralysis cannot be achieved 
by only speed. 
 
 
3. 2 Jointness / Intelligence  
 
Speed was decisive during OIF, but "speed" could never have been effective if it has 
not been supported by air dominance and overwhelming superiority in firepower 
backed by far great situational awareness and a common operating picture (COP). U.S 
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forces used coordination of air-land-naval operations and new technology to 
supplement the numerical inferiority.  
 
 
Traditionally, ground forces advance only after air or ground firepower incapacitate 
adversaries. In the Gulf War, after firepower of air, navy and army was employed 
during 38 days, and ground forces advanced. But in the Iraq War, ground forces 
advanced only after 15 hours. That is, joint operation of air- land- navy was executed 
at the beginning of Iraq War, which shows the maximization of unification of fighting 
strength. Based close coordination, joint warfare and combined arms were executed 
effectively. Followings are examples how to execute joint operation.  
 
 
CAS (Close Air Support) in battle of Baghdad showed the jointness of ground and 
air forces. In this battle, 3rd armor division made a full use of A-FAC to get effective 
air support. To get air dominance and support ground forces in low altitude, the air 
defense system of Iraq had to be neutralized before air force attack. Special Forces in 
the army played a decisive role in giving correct target list in SEAD (Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defense) fire. Also ground forces set up 30 ×30 Kill-Box outside of 
FSCL (Fire Support Coordination Line) to ensure aircraft activity. The rapid 
maneuver of ground forces has fatal problems: side threat and extended LOC (Line 
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of Communications). In the Gulf War the mission allocation of strike sorties flew 
roughly 55 percent of all sorties. In the Iraq War, the figures were evidently over 75 
percent to ensure ground forces advance without side threat. To maintain 
sustainability in logistics, the United States deployed 120 C-130s and 7 C-17s full-
time to the theater, plus large additional numbers of lighter transport aircraft. 
USCENTCOM reports that the United States flew 7,100 airlift sorties between G-Day 
and April 1, moved about 55,000 short tons, and deployed some 76,000 passengers 
between G-Day and April 9. During the full course of the war, the USAF flew 7,413 
airlift sorties and Australia flew 263. Also there are different improvements in army- 
navy- air forces operations. In the Gulf War, Tomahawk cruise missile could be 
programmed in three days to launch after received report from special force, but in the 
Iraq War it needed only one hour. In addition, aircraft carriers were critical substitute 
fort air base.  
 
 
This joint operation can be executed by the intelligence system, called C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance), which enables forces: 1) to judge accurate situational awareness; 2) 
to get intelligence on enemy and to co-owner situation and intelligence more quickly 
among the allied forces at every level; 3) to communicate more rapidly among all 
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units. This improves the speed of decision, which allow adversary not to react 
effectively.  
 
 
The United States had vastly improved every aspect of its intelligence, targeting, and 
command and control capabilities since the last Gulf War. Its combination of imagery, 
electronic intelligence, signals intelligence, and human intelligence was honed in 
Afghanistan, and improved communications and command and intelligence fusion at 
every level gave it near real-time day and night situational awareness.  
 
 
In the aspect of ISR, various high-tech weapons were employed: JSTARS, UAVs. E-
8C JSTARS is a joint development project of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army that 
provides an airborne, stand-off range, surveillance and target acquisition radar and 
command and control center, and play a role of sensor aircraft. The UAVs included 
larger systems like the Predator, Global Hawk, and the Pointer that the United States 
used in Afghanistan and Gulf War. In the Iraq War, the Coalition also made use of 
new tactical systems like the U.S. Army Hunter and Shadow, the Marine Corp's 
Dragon Eye, and the USAF Force Protection Surveillance System. In addition, some 
80 dedicated Coalition aircraft flew more than 1,000 sorties on IS&R missions. They 
gathered some 42,000 battlefield images and provided 2,400 mission hours of 
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SIGINT coverage, 3,200 hours of full mission video, and 1,700 hours of moving 
target indicator coverage.  
 
 
As already written, improvements in C4I and the structure of the IS&R effort sharply 
reduced the time between the acquisition of targeting data and actual fire on the target. 
C4I plays a critical role in recognizing situation through many ways like COP 
(Common Operating Picture), TRITAC (Joint Tactical Communication System). In 
addition, improved C4ISR enhanced the capabilities of Joint Operations and close 
coordination, which resulted in securing the speed and informing the targets to attack 
with PGM.   
 
 
3. 3 Precision  
 
Precision weapon can strike the core of enemy without mass damage, which leads to 
loss the control of adversary. That is, strategic paralysis can be executed. The ability 
to use precision weapons throughout day and night and in virtually all weathers 
allowed the US land forces to exploit their speed, as well as reduced the need to take 
time to secure their flanks and rear areas. Finally, the use of air and missile strikes 
against Iraqi leadership and communications centers further disrupted an already 
weak and heavily politicized Iraqi command and control system, and ensured that Iraq 
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could not react in time to the speed of the US advance. Laser and GPS guidance 
system improved its precision.  
 
 
 As table 3.5 shows, the key precision weapons the Coalition used in its missile and 
air strikes included sea-launched 802 BGM-109 TLAM (Tomahawk) cruise missiles 
and air-launched 153 AGM-86 C/D CALCMs.  
 
Table 3.5  
Rounds of Precision Weapon used in the Iraq War  
 
  BGM-109 AGM-86 BGU EBGU-27 JDAM AGM-98 
rounds 802 153 8,618 98 6,542 48 
 
They included 8,618 laser-guided bombs (GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-16, GBU-24, 
GBU-27, and GBU-28). They fired 6,542 JDAM GPS-guided bombs (GBU-31, 
GBU-32, GBU-53, and GBU-37) and 408 AGM-88 HARM high-speed anti-radiation 
missiles.  
 
 
These figures reflect the fact that the development of inexpensive strap-on kits for 
laser and GPS guided weapons made mass strikes far more affordable and cost 
effective, and enabled the United States to allow strike aircraft to operate outside of 
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the effective range of most current light air defense systems. The United States 
delivered 30 percent more laser-guided bombs than GPS-guided weapons, in part 
because laser illumination is more rapid and accurate in dynamic targeting.  
 
 
In the aspect of air forces, precision of artillery was useful to joint operations.  The 
flow of intelligence and targeting data to artillery units was better than in previous 
wars, and artillery was more maneuverable and quicker to react. It took eight minutes 
to set up the standard M109 155mm howitzer in the Gulf War. It took 30 seconds to 
set up the Army's Paladin 155mm howitzer in the Iraq War.  
 
 
U.S. artillery forces used MLRS/ATACMS. Major General David H. Piraeus, 
commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), stated that his 
division used 114 ATACMS and used them in conjunction with both attack 
helicopters and in forces whose combined arms elements made equally good use of 
anti-tank guided weapons as precision artillery. Also, U.S. artillery forces will have 
acquired considerably more lethality if the use of the SADARM proves to have been 
effective. The new M898 SADARM is the artillery's first fire-and-forget multi-sensor 
munitions. It can be fired from any 155mm howitzer and delivers two separate sub-
munitions with one projectile. It is an indirect fire munitions intended primarily to 
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counter enemy artillery, and it is fired after counter-battery radar, such as the Q37 Fire 
finder, locates enemy artillery. It can also attack other armored vehicles and air 
defense systems.  
 
 
 In a word, EBO can be perfectly executed when four factors (speed, jointness, 
intelligence and precision) are provided at the same time. The core of EBO is to 
neutralize or incapacitate adversary’s control on its system. It is possible to co-owner 
and to disseminate intelligence on enemies through the latest C4ISR. The close joint 
operation in ground, sea and air forces keep the physical speed as well as 
psychological speed. In addition, the long range missile with precision reduces 
unnecessary expense and victims as well as can attack the core of adversary. Finally, 
the Iraq’s leadership did lose its grip on nation system by the US forces. The U.S 
Forces could achieve four elements due to Continuous research, development, 
investment and analysis on the past war and battle. In contrast, the South Korea 
Forces lags behind the U.S in many respects.  
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Chapter 4  Directions for Applying EBO into the Korean Military Forces 
 
The ROK Forces should develop and reinforce our military strength in weapon 
system, organization structure and operation art to deter war. Even though some 
people used to insist that such a big invest are ineffective in peace time, we should 
prepare for various threats and mission in an efficient way, which are neighbor 
countries’ military threats and to execute coalition operations. That is a duty of nation 
and military personnel. To do so, we must set up directions to reinforce the 
capabilities for executing EBO.  
 
4. 1 Necessity of EBO  
 
 Recently the balance of power has been complicate. The confrontation between the 
US – Japan - Australia and the China – Russia is stimulating an armament race. The 
ROK Military will get the full operational control after 2012. In addition, warfare 
aspect is being changed rapidly. In these cases there is no choice but to improve our 
military power in every level. 
 
4.1.1 Military Threat in the Korean Peninsula  
 
Economic cooperation and interdependence is increasing in Northeast Asia. Due to 
China's continued economic growth, Japan's economic recovery, and Russia's political 
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stability and economic growth, the strategic status of Northeast Asia is being 
enhanced. On the other hand, the structure of checks and rivalry is also deepening, 
while countries in the region are competing for more hegemony and influence in the 
region.  
 
 
The United States and Japan declared to jointly respond to potential security threats 
rising in the region. While actively supporting the US policy of anti-terrorism and 
nonproliferation, Japan is showing moves to extend the activity sphere of its Self-
Defense Forces to the world beyond the Indian Ocean and, at the same time, is 
pursuing "a normal military force of a normal state." In response to the strengthening 
of the bilateral alliance between the United States and Japan, China and Russia have 
been strengthening their strategic partnership. In conclusion, uncertainties stemming 
from traditional conflicts and rivalries are increasing with the remaining Cold War 
structure in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia is the region where security situations are 
tenser than any other region.  
 
 
North Korea's nuclear issue is not only the most serious threat but also challenges 
the security of Northeast Asia and the world. As North Korea conducted a nuclear test 
on October 9, 2006, the international community imposed sanctions on North Korea 
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and North Korea reacted strongly to such sanctions. Accordingly, instability is 
increasing in Northeast Asian security. On top of North Korea's nuclear issue, the 
Cross-Straits issue, diverging views on history between countries in the region, 
concerns about territorial claims add to regional frictions. China adopted a political 
resolution to strongly oppose independence of Taiwan in accordance with the "One-
China Principle" at the 4th Plenary Session of the 10th National People's Congress on 
March 14, 2006 when she celebrated the first anniversary of enacting the "Anti-
Secession Law." Tension across the Straits heightened because Taiwanese President 
Chen Shui-bian announced the intent to accomplish Taiwan's independence at any 
costs, one day before the National People's Congress resolution.  
 
 
Japan's major politicians pay visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and some conservative 
groups beautify the past history of their invasion of Northeast Asia. This aroused 
concerns of neighboring countries because such behavior is detrimental to the 
improvement of peace in Northeast Asia. Moreover, there remain territorial disputes 
such as disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyudao for the Chinese) Islands between China 
and Japan, and disputes over four Northern Islands between Japan and Russia. Since 
the sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands is known to preserve natural gas and oil 
reserves, China, Japan and Taiwan claim territorial rights one another. In relation to 
 - 39 - 
 
the establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), countries in the region 
adhere to their own positions in order to utilize the ocean space for economic benefits. 
Differences in their positions regarding the EEZ become factors for potential conflicts.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Military Forces of the Four Major Powers in North East  
 
From the military point of view, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia had 
been competing with each other to maintain and expand their influence in this region, 
despite the lack of a multilateral security cooperative regime in place. Furthermore, 
most countries in the region are pursuing military transformation and technical 
innovation in order to modernize and enhance their military capabilities under the new 
security environment. Up-to-date military posture of the four major powers 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula is depicted in Figure 4.1. (Refer to Appendix A. 
Military Capabilities of Neighboring Countries)  
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South Korea has some 680,000 troops backed up by 29,500 US troops confronting 
North Korea's 1.1 million-strong communist army since the Korean War. So we have 
to consider North Korean military threat. North Korea is striving to stabilize the 
regime, and making efforts to maintain the regime by reorganizing the party-
government apparatus and by setting up a new economic development strategy. After 
the nuclear test, North Korea sought to cement internal unity and promote national 
pride by holding a military-civilian ceremony to celebrate its successful nuclear test. 
The North Korean military seeks to develop missiles by making test launches of new 
surface-to-surface missiles and ground-to-sea missiles. At the same time, the military 
seeks to strengthen core combat capabilities such as the Cheonma tanks and the long-
range artillery munitions through test-firing those munitions. (Refer to Appendix B. 
Comparison of Military Capabilities between ROK and DPRK)  
 
 
The core of its military strategy is to execute a surprise attack at an early stage, to 
grasp the military initiative combined with a warfare strategy including regular and 
irregular warfare, and to expand the initial victory by concentrating firepower and 
mechanized and self-propelled maneuver units. To do so, major combat capabilities 
are deployed to the south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The North Korean army 
 - 41 - 
 
consists of a total of 19 corps level units, in which there are nine frontal and rear corps, 
four mechanized corps, one tank corps, one artillery corps, the Pyongyang Defense 
Command, Border Guard Command, Missile Guidance Bureau, and Light-infantry 
Instruction Bureau. Major combat units comprise more than 170 divisions and 
brigades including 75 infantry divisions (including instruction divisions), 30 artillery 
brigades, 10 tank brigades, 20 mechanized brigades, 25 special warfare brigades, and 
10 other brigades. Additionally, it is expected that North Korean special warfare units 
comprising around 120,000 troops including those of frontline special warfare units 
will infiltrate into the entire area of the South and will plunge the rear areas of the 
South into chaos.  
 
The North Korean Navy consists of two fleet Commands in the East Sea and the 
West Sea respectively, twelve squadrons, and two maritime sniper brigades under the 
central control of the Navy Command. North Korea holds 60 submarines including 
Romeo-class and Sango (Shark)-class submarines and over 10 Yugo-class 
submersibles. These can perform missions of laying mines, attacking surface ships, 
and supporting operations by special warfare units. Support ships include landing 
vessels such as landing ships, high-speed landing craft, and landing craft air 
cushioned (LCAC), as well as minesweepers. The North Korean Air Force comprises 
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four air divisions, two tactical transportation brigades, two sniper brigades, five 
surface-to -air missile brigades, and three radar regiments under the central control of 
the Air Force Command.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Potential North Korean Long-Range Missile Capabilities  
 
Pyongyang is developing a long-range Taepodong-II missile. In July 2006, the North 
Korea tested and launched Taepodong-II type, Scud, and Rodong missiles, thereby 
raising tension on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. As figure 4.2 depicts, 
the range of the Taepodong-II is expected to go beyond 6,700 km and the range will 
be able to be extended if the weight of the delivery body is reduced or three-stage 
rockets are loaded additionally. In addition, in December 1961, North Korea launched 
its chemical weapons development programs including research and construction of 
production facilities in compliance with Kim Il-sung's "Declaration of 
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Chemicalization." It is assessed that Pyongyang has been producing poison gas and 
biological weapons since the 1980s. It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 
tons of a variety of agents including nerve agents remains stored in a number of 
facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce 
biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, small pox, and cholera.  
 
 
4.1.2 Efficient Execution of Coalition Operations  
 
The South Korea took over military operational control over its own forces in 
peacetime in 1996. Even though the United States had hoped to effect the wartime 
command transition as early as 2009, on February 13 2007, US Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Jang Soo decided to amend the 
current South Korean-US Combined Forces Command on April 17, 2012. After 4 
months, General BB Bell, commander of US troops in Seoul, and South Korean Joint 
Chiefs of Staff chairman Kim Kwan-Jin agreed to detailed time-lines to follow up 
their defense chiefs' accord. After April 17, 2012, the South Korean military will have 
full operational control of the country in time of war as well as peacetime, and US 
forces in Korea will move to a supporting role.  
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Figure 4.3 Time Plan for Transition of Wartime Operational Control  
 
As figure 4.3 shows, South Korea should have “initial operational capability (IOC)” 
by late 2009 and full capability (FOC) by the end of 2011 to enable the transfer at 10 
a.m. on April 17, 2012 under the time frame. South Korea is trying to build up its 
military strength against North Korea, and to replace the current US-led joint 
operation plan to comply with the change at a slower pace until 2012.  
 
 
In case a war breaks out in Korea or ROK executes any military operation with US, 
South Korea will face the new US military strategy and operation art and weapons. 
EBO is essential in US Military strategy. As already known, EBO is linked to many 
state-of-the art weapons system, C4ISR and strike on the core of adversary called 
node. To enhance efficiency of coalition operation, ROK should try: 1) to understand 
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the concept of EBO; 2) apply it to Korean military; 3) to make the best use of the new 
technology of US.  
 
 
4.1.3 Preparation for the Future Warfare  
 
The US has the initiative in military affairs, weapon system, military strategy etc. As 
US develops its military technology and strategy, other states are trying to catch up 
US. That is, the united States Forces shows the aspect of future warfare and how to 
execute future war.  
 
 
Commanders of planners can see every battle situation at real time. 
Battle      situation including land, sky, sea, space and internet can be shown by only 
one screen. They can recognize the COG of enemy to be able to control adversary. In 
this case past forces intended to destruct all troops, facilities to achieve objectives, 
which are called attrition or annihilation. However, in future warfare the COG should 
be attacked by PGM to achieve the desired effect without mass destruction. This PGM 
and stealth weapon like F-117 nighthawk is modified to be able to cover a longer 
distance.  
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As figure 4.4 shows the capability of missiles, each states has intention of 
developing a long-range missile with more close precision, which is capable of 
supporting a variety of regional contingencies. In addition, network plays core role in 
executing operation. So every state is trying to develop weapon which can interfere an 
opponent's network system and protect from adversary's interference. Also as the 
China showed recently in Asia, the initiative of space has good or bad influence on 
each state's security 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Short, Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in China  
 
In conclusion, neighboring countries  has its own benefits: 1) China has big territory 
and continuing economic growth, and consists of around 1.2 billion people; 2) Japan 
has building powerful military strength based on economic power and high-tech 
industry; 3) Russia has big territory as well as abundant natural resources, and hold 
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strong military strength. Even though South Korea cannot catch up their innate merits, 
South Korea should prepare urgent and potential threat. In addition, ROK has to 
strengthen ROK-US alliance to use of US advanced military system. In this aspect 
ROK military forces should endeavor to apply and understand EBO.  
 
 
4. 2  Directions for Application 
 
 The ROK Forces is trying to apply EBO. There are some problems. It needs big 
expense and flexible thinking. In addition we have no enough data and clear 
directions. Based on the analysis on the Iraq War, four elements (speed, jointness, 
intelligence and precision) are the directions to execute EB0. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Pursuit of Speed  
 
Having to deal with North Korea's massive conventional forces, South Korea forces 
have maintained a quantity-centric force structure. Due to this manpower-oriented 
force structure and army-oriented management, actual combat capability has been 
insufficient despite its huge force size, and the unbalance among the military services 
has been brought about.  
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In case of Army, It has maintained a loose structure with a large of troops and 
outdated weapons. There is 10 corps, 47 divisions and about 540,000 troops, which 
are made up of primarily foot soldiers with light weapons, but mechanized forces are 
insufficient. It has multi-level command structure from the squad to army or JCS and 
MND. Even though combat-oriented management is emphasized, most of field units 
are operated under the principle of troop’s management. Finally, ROK Army has 
faced some problems, big structure without speed. In addition, South Korea forces 
have stressed the readiness posture to react North Korea forces' action, which is 
passive system and makes ROK Army more loosen.  
 
 
According to the Defense Reform 2020, to upgrade existing warfare capabilities and 
remove multi-level command structure, 10 corps will be reduce by four to six, and 47 
divisions will also be reduced to 20. The shortage will be replaced by state-of-the art 
weapon system, reinforced maneuverability and fire- power. As it was witnessed 
during the Iraq War, rapid maneuver and decision is very decisive to control enemy. 
To achieve speedy maneuver, ROK Army has to acquire more mechanized forces 
with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles. Also ROK forces 
should build capabilities like US air assault division to attack targets and deploy 
troops by helicopters. But we must consider the characteristics of Korean peninsula, 
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which is made of 70% of mountain areas. As US forces has been suffered from it’s a 
guerilla actions in Afghanistan made of mostly rugged mountains and in the Vietnam 
War, it is desirable to use or strength special forces to clean up guerilla.  
 
 
By removing multi-level command structure, ROK forces can improve it's the speed 
of decision making. First of all, the continuous development of C4ISR can play a 
critical role in enhancing decision cycle. This is needed to provide commanders with 
better information for decision making in order to exercise faster and more effective 
command and control in both joint and combined operations. To prepare the future 
warfare, JCS has run CPAS (Command Post Automation System) from July 1999, 
and Navy does KNTDS (Korea Navy Tactical Data System), and Air forces does 
MCRC (Master Control and Reporting Center). ROK forces have plans to build 
the integrated and jointed C4I system through enlargement of CPAS in three stages 
until 2015. In these stages, South Korea forces needs to apply the advanced US 
C4ISR system. Especially, we have to focus on developing ability to visualize 
battlefield and grasp it in three dimension, and co-owner as well as spread information 
in real-time among all military services and its components like COP in US C4ISR 
system.  
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4.2.2 The Pursuit of Jointness / Intelligence  
 
South Korea Forces is trying to balance among the military services. As the Defense 
Reform 2020 shows establishing JCS-centric operational execution system, each 
service feels the need of cooperation to achieve more effectively goal through the 
lesson from the Iraq War.  
 
 
The Air Force is the pivotal force in modern and future warfare. The incapacitation 
of enemy air defense and airfield is important to secure air superiority. That's why, the 
Air forces needs its own precision strikes as well as Special Forces' guide and missile 
launched in sea and land, and artillery's fire-power. According to the Defense Reform 
2020, the Air Force pursues the capability to secure operational capability over the 
entire Korean peninsula in order to retaliate on enemy attack as well as to ensure air 
superiority and proper conditions as much as possible for ground and naval operations 
in wartime. So we can consider two aspects: weapon system and employment of 
troops.  
 
In weapon system, it is no wonder that we must develop and acquire precision 
weapons, which is guided by laser or GPS. This will be treated in next in detail. In use 
of troops, it is more advisable to improve and expand special force and its capabilities. 
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Also general units have to upgrade their ability to use air strikes through training 
GFAC and development of communication technology between land and air force. As 
in Baghdad Operation US land forces used the CAS effectively, we should have 
ability to make the best use of air force power. That is one of ways to attack the COG 
of enemy with rapid speed.  
 
 
However, before attack we have to know well of adversary through various means. 
That is, intelligence on adversary must be preceded. Intelligence is related to above-
mentioned C4ISR. The capability to get better and faster information on enemy 
depends on the technology. As US Forces used JSTAR, AWACS and satellite, we 
have to secure such capability through buying or developing that kind of weapons as 
soon as possible. ROK have UAV companies, and plan to equip ISR system through 
buying Global Hawk, and is developing reconnaissance satellite called Arirang-3 with 
black-and-white 80 cm resolution. However, we are shortage of organization and 
human resources to deal with those technologies. Also we need to recognize quickly 
the COG of enemy though knowledge of adversary.  
 
4.2.3 The Pursuit of Precision  
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As already mentioned, precision is need to reduce cost and casualties. Based on 
exact knowledge on enemy, we need capabilities to strike the core of enemy, which 
can lead to strategic paralysis. Those capabilities are PGM like BGM-109 TLAM 
(Tomahawk) cruise missiles, AGM-86 C/D CALCMs and JDAM which are laser-
guided or GPS-guided bombs with long distance.  
 
 
In 2006 South Korea Forces established the GMC (Guided Missile Command) to 
prepare North Korean ballistic missile and long range gun as well as potential threat 
among neighboring countries. ROK Army has K3 Hyun-Mu Missile, which can cover 
above 180 Km, and can employ ATACMS system with M270 IPDS. If we have a 
long-range missile with more close precision, we can deter any aggressions. Even 
though it can be arms race in the North East, we should consider this problem to 
prepare the situation after unification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5.  Conclusion  
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U.S forces showed the future warfare in Iraq War, and proved that Attrition or 
annihilation mass destruction and serial or sequential warfare are a past concept. In 
the Iraq War, U.S forces can get the knowledge on enemy from the satellite based on 
new technology, and spread and co-owner its knowledge in real time, and strike 
required objectives not all of enemy, execute non-military operation, and control land, 
air, sea, space and internet.  
 
 
US Forces escaped the past operation concept which is attrition or serial warfare. US 
has developed ancient win by default and named it EBO. Based on cutting-edge 
technology, US forces need do not have to attack all of enemy. In contrast to, they just 
do strike objectives that can lead to loss of control. As Secretary Rumsfeld mentioned, 
EBO can be executed through speed, jointness, intelligence and precision. To make 
well use of EBO, those four elements should be preceded. US Forces have trying to 
have capabilities to carry out EBO, and showed their abilities in the Iraq War.  
 
 
South Korea has lived in the arms race. China, Russia, Japan and North Korea have 
strengthened their military power. In the short view, ROK should have capabilities to 
be able to deter North Korean threat and to retaliate for its attack. After April 2012, 
when ROK forces will have full operational control of the country in time of war as 
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well as peacetime, ROK forces feel need to understand EBO concept and system for 
better coalition operation between ROK and US. In the long view, South Korea has to 
consider neighbor military strength. ROK may face situation like sandwich in the 
future. Military alliance of China and Russia has stimulated alliance of US and Japan. 
That's why; South Korea should build capabilities to defend through its own power. 
That is, ROK have enough military power to be able to deter neighbor threat. South 
Korea forces should establish system to get and analyze enemies which may be China, 
Japan etc. Based on accurate knowledge, we should be able to attack the COG of 
adversary, which can deter aggression. In the worst case, South Korea can execute 
military operation in various regions. In that case ROK must secure air superiority 
through close joint operation and coordination among military services. In addition, 
rapid decision and maneuver can lead to quick win with minimum blood. Even though 
the Defense Reform 2020 contains those contents, South Korea forces should consider 
EBO in terms of speed, jointness, intelligence and precision to build mighty military 
strength.  
 
 
To improve the speed of units ROK Forces should get out of current manpower-
oriented and think the military strength as the capabilities not the number of troops. 
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So the air assault unit is needed to upgrade response and maneuver. In addition, 
current special forces is more professionalized to obtain accurate information, and to 
guide various fire power, and to strike COG of enemy. In the aspects of decision cycle 
we need the system to co-owner information at the same time, and to spread it at real 
time, and to visualize it. The current army-oriented structure and operation should be 
removed for improving joint operations. First of all commander should consider ways 
to acquire air superiority at the beginning of war. After that, Air forces should 
cooperate with the ground Forces to protect side threat and extended LOC. C4I 
system and ISR assets must be expanded and improved. Even though those 
equipments are very expensive, KOR Forces should invest to secure high-tech C4ISR 
System. The capabilities to more quickly identify enemies’ actions and COG is 
essential to decide faster. Therefore we should develop and purchase the ISR assets. 
Based on the accurate information and rapid decision we can take actions faster than 
enemy. Also KOR forces should develop stealth and precision weapon to execute 
strategic paralysis and parallel or simultaneous attack. 
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[ Appendix A ] Military Capabilities of Neighboring Countries  
 
￿ Total  
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  US Russia China Japan 
Total Troops 1,473,960 1,037,000 2,255,000 240,812 
 
￿ Army  
 
 
US Russia China Japan 
Troops 502,000 395,000 1,600,000 149,571 
Division 
(Reserve) 
10(8) 36(15) 59 10 
Tanks 
Light tanks 
Reconnaissance 
tanks 
Armored vehicles 
7,620 
6,719 
96 
14,900 
22,950 
150 
2,000 
24,990 
8,580 
1,000 
- 
45,000 
950 
- 
90 
950 
Towed artillery 
Self-propelled 
artillery 
MLRS 
Mortars 
1,547 
2,037 
830 
2,066 
12,785 
6,010 
4,350 
6,100 
14,000 
1,200 
2,400 
100 
480 
290 
110 
2,000 
Anti-tank 
guided weapons 
Dragon: 
19,000 
Javelin: 950 
Various types 
of AT series 
but quantity 
unknown 
7,200 850 
Surface-to-air 
missiles 
1,281 2,460 284 800 
Helicopters 4,597 1,700 364 495 
Aircraft 298 - 4+ 15 
 
 
 
￿ Navy  
 
  US Russia China Japan 
Troops 376,750 142,000 255,000 44,928 
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Submarines(strategic) 
Aircraft carriers 
Cruisers 
Destroyers 
Frigates 
Corvettes 
Mine sweepers 
Landing vessels 
Landing craft 
Support vessels 
Cargo vessels 
Reserve transportation 
fighters 
Helicopters 
Marine divisions 
80(16) 
12 
27 
49 
30 
21 
26 
40 
200 
35 
26 
127 
752 
608 
3 
54(13) 
1 
6 
15 
19 
88 
60 
21 
80 
435 
- 
- 
266 
120 
1 
69(1) 
- 
- 
21 
42 
331 
39 
56 
50 
163 
? 
? 
200 
51 
2 
16 
- 
- 
45 
9 
7 
31 
8 
- 
- 
27 
8 
- 
107(P-3C 96) 
- 
 
￿ Air Forces  
 
 
US Russia China Japan 
Troops 379,000 170,000 400,000 46,313 
Long-range bombers 
Reconnaissance aircraft 
Command aircraft 
Fighters 
Transport aircraft 
Tankers 
Training aircraft 
Helicopters 
Civilian reserve aircraft 
205 
261 
30 
3,200 
1,025 
659 
1,516 
196 
927 
116 
160 
20 
1,500 
354 
20 
980 
848 
1,500 
222 
54 
- 
1,200 
296 
10 
493 
80 
? 
- 
27 
- 
360 
42 
- 
170 
- 
- 
 
 
[ Appendix B ] Comparison of Military Capabilities between ROK and DPRK  
 
Classification R O K DPRK 
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Troops 
(peace time) 
Total 680,000 1,170,000 
Army 541,000 1,000,000 
Navy 68,000 60,000 
Air force 85,000 110,000 
Principal 
 
 
 
 
Forces 
 
 
 
 
Capabilities 
Army 
Units 
Corps 12 19 
Divisions 50 69 
Maneuver Brigade 19 3,700 
Equipment 
Tanks 2,300 2,100 
Armored vehicles 2,500 8,500 
Field artillery 5,100 4,800 
MLRS 200 80 
Surface-to-surface 
guided weapon 
20 420 
Navy 
Surface 
ships 
warships 120 260 
Landing vessels 10 30 
Mine warfare ships 10 30 
Support vessels 20 30 
Submarines 10 60 
Air 
Forces 
Fighters 500 820 
Special aircrafts 80 30 
Support aircrafts 190 510 
Helicopters 680 310 
Reserve Forces (troops) 3,040,000 7,700,000 
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